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The Facts
The aim of this article is to review the concept of the quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY), a widely used measure of health
improvement that is used to guide health-care resource allocation
decisions. The QALY was originally developed as a measure of
health effectiveness for cost-effectiveness analysis, a method
intended to aid decision-makers charged with allocating scarce
resources across competing health-care programs [1–3]. We refer
to this original concept of the QALY, as deﬁned in the early
literature, as the “conventional” QALY, recognizing that alter-
native conceptual models have been proposed, including but not
limited to so-called “equity-weighted” QALYs. The US Panel on
Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine [4] and the National
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in Britain have
both endorsed the conventional QALY for their “reference case,”
i.e., a standardized methodological approach to promote com-
parability in cost-effectiveness analyses of different health-care
interventions.
In using QALYs, we assume that a major objective of decision-
makers is to maximize health or health improvement across the
population subject to resource constraints. The use of QALYs
further assumes that health or health improvement can be mea-
sured or valued based on amounts of time spent in various health
states. The conventional QALY is therefore a valuation of health
beneﬁt. We note, however, that decision-makers may also have
other objectives such as equity, fairness, and political goals, all of
which currently must be handled outside the conventional Special
Issue [5] addresses some of these variations on the conventional
QALY. The QALY was not initially developed to aid individual
patient decision-making, although its use has sometimes been
extended into clinical decision analyses for this purpose.
The core concept of the conventional QALY is grounded in
decision science and expected utility theory. The basic construct
is that individuals move through health states over time and that
each health state has a value attached to it. Health, which is what
we are seeking to maximize, is deﬁned as the value-weighted
time—life-years weighted by their quality—accumulated over the
relevant time horizon to yield QALYs. Health states must be
valued on a scale where the value of being dead must be 0,
because the absence of life is considered to be worth 0 QALYs. By
convention, the upper end of the scale is deﬁned as perfect health,
with a value of 1. To permit aggregation of QALY changes, the
value scale should have interval scale properties such that, for
example, a gain from 0.2 to 0.4 is equally valuable as a gain from
0.6 to 0.8. States worse than dead can exist and they would have
a negative value and subtract from the number of QALYs. These
conditions, along with an assumption of risk neutrality over
life-years, are sufﬁcient to ensure that the QALY is a useful
representation of health state preferences.
What Is Value?
In the conventional concept of QALYs, a health state that is more
desirable is more valuable. Value is equated with preference or
desirability. A critical question is: desirable to whom?
One possibility is to deﬁne the desirability of a health state
based on how an individual would value being in that health
state herself or himself. This measurement of individual prefer-
ences is commonly accomplished by preference surveys in which
standard gambles, time trade-offs, or visual analog scales are
used to assess preferences for speciﬁed health states. A key issue,
to which we will return, is whether the relevant values for
resource allocation decision-making are those of people who are
currently experiencing the health state of interest, or those of
people on whose behalf the decisions are being made and who
may or may not be in the health state at the time they assess its
value. An alternative to assessing preferences for health states
directly is to assess preferences for a small set of health domains,
or attributes, and then to construct a multiattribute utility as a
summary measure that reﬂects preferences both within and
across health domains.
As noted in passing previously, the desirability of a health
state can also be conceptualized in terms of people’s preferences
about the health of the community (i.e., mainly the health of
others, but possibly including themselves as a member) and not
about their own health. Valuation of community health directly,
instead of aggregating up from preferences about individual
health, permits the decision-maker to incorporate objectives
other than health maximization. We return to this issue later, and
it is also discussed in the next article in this Special Issue [5].
Preferences about health states in the community are sometimes
measured using person trade-offs, although standard gambles,
time trade-offs, and rating scales could be applied to this task as
well as to individual health state preferences.
An important aspect of conventional QALYs—regardless of
the preference measure or the perspective used in assessing health
state values—is that the approach values health states and not
changes in health states. Special Issue [5] (Nord et al. this issue)
considers alternatives to the conventional QALY that value
changes in, rather than absolute levels of, health as the valued
outcome.
How Are QALYs Used?
Who are the decision-makers and what are they asking? Some of
the broad categories of the uses of QALYs in health decisions are
represented by the columns in Table 1, and we discuss these ﬁrst.
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Next, we turn to the various attributes of the procedures used to
deﬁne and construct the QALY measure, represented by the rows
of Table 1. First, what is being valued? Second, whom should
we ask, and whose preferences should matter: people currently
experiencing the health state, or others? Third, what should be
asked—what valuation technique should be used, and how
should it be administered? Fourth, how are the health outcomes
that are the object of the preference assessments deﬁned? Are
they health states (the conventional approach), paths of health
states over time, or changes in health states, either at a point in
time or over time? We take up these aspects of QALYs sequen-
tially. The last two rows of Table 1, to which we will return in
discussing each aspect of QALYs, summarize some of the addi-
tional assumptions needed to invoke the QALY as a reasonable
measure of health or health improvement, and some additional
considerations that are left out of the QALY.
What Is the Question?
We have arbitrarily divided the universe of questions for which
QALYs, broadly deﬁned, may provide part of the answer into
three categories, as reﬂected in the threemajor columns in Table 1.
The ﬁrst category (in the right-hand column) comprises societal
resource allocation questions—that is, priority setting across pro-
posed programs and program changes. As stated above, this has
been the primary focus of the conventional QALY. The second
category (left-hand column) encompasses personal decisions that
individuals make to affect their own health, including clinical
decisions and decisions about the choice of health insurance
coverage. A third category of QALY use, which we call societal
audit or programmatic audit (middle column), is to evaluate
ongoing activities or programs in terms of the health of a popu-
lation. For this purpose, one needs a description of the health of
the population, either at a point in time or changes over time.
The last two rows of Table 1, to which we will return in
discussing each aspect of QALYs, summarize some of the addi-
tional assumptions that support the QALY as a reasonable
measure of health or health improvement, and some additional
considerations that are left out of the QALY.
What Is BeingValued?
For personal clinical or insurance decisions, the decision-maker is
an individual (or household unit) who is concerned about
the desirability of each of the possible health states. We often
approach these decisions analytically by using decision trees or
various kinds of optimization models in which the decision-
maker seeks to optimize expected utility. Because the perspective
is that of the individual decision-maker, the relevant utilities are
those of the individual, as viewed at the time of the decision.
Hence, if the possible outcomes of the decision include health
states that the individual has never experienced, the relevant
preferences are those of the individual ex ante the decision and ex
ante any experience in the health state. Of course, a prudent
decision-maker would seek to become well informed about those
possible health states, including possibly asking people who have
experienced them to convey how they feel about them.
For purposes of programmatic or societal audit, we are
usually interested in valuing the current health of the affected
population members from their own perspective. A variant
approach might be to take into account not only the desirability
of the current health states but also the desirability of the future
health prospects of the members of the population, including life
expectancy and anticipated health prognoses. A rationale for the
latter approach to societal audit might be that if the population
has a high prevalence of risk factors for future mortality and
morbidity, their health would be considered less desirable than a
population with similar current health but a better prognosis.
Table 1 Matrix characterizing uses and deﬁnitions of QALYs
Question: Personal clinical decision or
insurance decision
Societal audit: evaluation of
ongoing activities or
programs
Societal resource allocation: priority setting
across proposed programs and program
changes
Value concept: whose
health outcome
and whose
preferences
Individual’s health: ex ante
desirability as seen by
the individual
Individuals’ health: experienced
utility, then aggregated
Individuals’ health:
ex ante
desirability as
seen by each
individual, then
aggregated
Community health:
the health of
others,* as seen
by each individual,
then aggregated
Whom to ask: The individual, informed by
patients/disabled people†
Those affected by the activity; e.g.,
patients/disabled people, those
“prevented” from a disease, etc.
Representative
sample of
population
Representative
sample of
population
Valuation technique: SG,‡ TTO,§ RS SG,‡ TTO,§ RS, or MAU instrument SG,‡ TTO,§ RS, or
MAU instrument
PTO, or
transformation of
MAU values
Health outcomes: Complete health
proﬁles over
time
Health states and
durations
Complete health
proﬁles over time
Health states and
durations
Health states and
durations
(conventional
QALY application)
Health states and
durations
Additional
assumptions
needed:
None, if SG used Risk neutrality on
longevity,
additivity across
time
Aggregation across
individuals
Risk neutrality on
longevity,
additivity across
time, aggregation
across individuals
Risk neutrality on
longevity,
additivity across
time, aggregation
across individuals
Risk neutrality on
longevity,
additivity across
time, aggregation
across individuals
Additional
considerations
needed:
Equity of actual
outcomes
Equity of actual
outcomes
Equity of potential
outcomes
Equity/fairness built
in to some
extent?
SG, standard gamble;TTO, time trade-off; RS, rating scale; MAU, multiattribute utility; PTO, person trade-off.
*In valuing health changes for others, respondents may include concerns for equity and fairness.
†Patients/disabled people can provide valuable information about the magnitude of the gain from adaptation, where such occurs, to temper the disutility as seen ex ante including the disutility
from the loss of opportunity.
‡SG may be preferred because it alone has been shown to have interval scale properties with respect to preferences, i.e., a change from 0.2 to 0.4 is equally preferred to a change from 0.6
to 0.8 [6].
§TTO is theoretically equivalent to SG under the conditions in which QALYs are appropriate as a utility (risk neutrality on longevity).
Note, however, that this method quickly becomes intractable for large problems because of the large number of possible health proﬁles.
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Whereas individual clinical or insurance decisions are gov-
erned by individual ex ante preferences, and programmatic or
societal audits are accomplished by measuring individual ex post
preferences, societal resource allocation decisions can be guided
by measures of value either from the perspective of individuals
(ex ante or ex post) or from the perspective of the community.
For individuals, this amounts to measuring the desirability of
health states to individuals—as in the case of individual clini-
cal decisions—and then aggregating across individuals. This
individual-based approach to measuring value is consistent with
the principle of consumer sovereignty, the keystone of welfare
economics, and this has been the approach most commonly
applied in constructing conventional QALYs. Individual health
preferences are measured through techniques such as the stan-
dard gamble, time trade-off, and visual analog scale. The prefer-
ences in conventional QALYs are usually ex ante, although they
could also be based on the values expressed by individuals who
ﬁnd themselves in the health states ex post [6].
For societal resource allocation decisions, the value of a
health outcome can also be elicited in terms of how individuals
feel about the health of others or of the community as a whole,
and then aggregated. The desirability of health states or health
state changes to others can incorporate concerns for fairness as
seen by each individual. For example, an individual might
attach higher value to health changes for people who start out
in poor health compared to people who start out in good
health.
Whom DoWe Ask?
From a societal point of view, we can either ask for people’s
preferences or values about their own health or about the health
of others. To determine how people value their own possible
health states, one would survey a representative sample of the
affected population—which includes patients or disabled people
as they occur in the population—and elicit preferences about a
range of health states. People who have not experienced particu-
lar health states should ideally be informed by knowledge of
what patients and disabled people tell them about what it is like
to be in those states. Although one might draw a contrast
between this ex ante approach and an ex post approach that
limits the relevant preferences to people who are currently expe-
riencing the health states of interest [6], there is not a complete
dichotomy. Individuals do have opportunities to become
informed about the adaptations that people go through when
they experience the various possible health states that the indi-
viduals are being asked to value.
A different answer to the question of whom to ask for pref-
erences to inform societal resource allocation decisions is to elicit
preferences regarding the health of the community at large,
rather than individual preferences for people’s own health. When
valuing the health of others, we would still tend to go to a
representative sample of the population, which includes patients
and disabled people as they occur and who are also informed by
what they know about the views that patients or disabled people
attach to their own health.
For programmatic or societal audit, we would go to the
members of the population of interest, and for personal clinical
decisions, we would go to the individual patient as the decision-
maker. In the context of individual decisions, it is clearly the
individual’s own preferences that we are interested in, with the
proviso that these preferences are informed by knowledge of
people who are in the health states that they may have not yet
experienced but may possibly experience.
What DoWe Ask?
The standard gamble is the method of choice for personal clinical
or insurance decisions, based on the principles of expected utility
maximization from decision theory. Nevertheless, the time trade-
off and possibly rating scales are also used to value health states
because of concern that the standard gamble may be subject to
cognitive biases in elicitation [7].
For the societal individualistic approach, preferences for
QALYs are obtained by using the standard gamble, time trade-
off, or rating scale, or by using multi-attribute instruments that
apply these methods to obtain preferences within and across
selected domains of health. For valuing the health of communi-
ties or others, the person trade-off offers an additional option.
The person trade-off could also be used at the individualistic
level, but it tends to be more naturally used in evaluating the
health of communities.
How DoWe AskTheseValue Questions?
The standard gamble is based on well-deﬁned, widely accepted
axioms of consistency of preferences under uncertainty such as
transitivity, independence, and continuity. The standard gamble
stands alone among these measures by having been shown to
have interval scale properties with respect to preferences, such
that a change from 0.2 to 0.4 is equally valued as a change from
0.6 to 0.8 [8]. The time trade-off tends to be approximately
equivalent to the standard gamble, as demonstrated by several
empirical studies. It has a unique conceptual relationship to
QALYs because it is explicitly a trade-off of time with an
impaired health state relative to healthy time—quality-adjusted
time. The time-trade-off is theoretically equivalent to the stan-
dard gamble under the conditions in which QALYs are appro-
priate as a utility, which include risk neutrality with respect to
longevity. Rating scales (including visual analog scales) are gen-
erally considered theoretically inferior to standard gambles or
time trade-offs because of the scaling biases they entail and the
fact that it involves a rating task rather than a choice task.
Nevertheless, they are not subject to cognitive biases in elicitation
that may be induced by the use of probabilities in the standard
gamble elicitation task [7], nor are they affected by temporal
discounting as in the time trade-off elicitation task [9].
Examples of multiattribute utility instruments include the
EuroQOL 5-item scale (EQ-5D), The 7-item Health Utilities
Index 2 scale, the 8-item Health Utilities Index 3 scale, the 6-item
SF-6D scale based on the SF-36, the 4-item Quality of Well-Being
scale, the 15-item 15D scale, and the 5-item Assessment of
Quality of Life scale. In this approach, the health states that are
valued comprise a matrix of combinations of health domains, or
attributes, which are associated with the particular instrument.
For example, the 243 health states in the EQ-5D are deﬁned by
selecting one of the three levels of health within each of the ﬁve
health domains. Patients classify themselves into one of the cells
in these matrices. Each cell comes with a score that has been
previously obtained by a survey of members of the community.
This is the method of choice in most contemporary cost-
effectiveness studies. It was the approach recommended by the
Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine [4], and it is
preferred by NICE. The problem is that different instruments
give different results, partly due to the preference elicitation
methods, partly due to choice of health attributes, and partly
due to the manner in which interactions across the individual
health attributes are modeled. Moreover, the value scores may
be population-speciﬁc (by country or by sociodemographic
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characteristics of the respondents), although less so empirically
than one might suspect.
The person trade-off is one example of another approach,
which we might label as population equivalence methods. Here,
individuals act as surrogate decision-makers and make hypo-
thetical choices about competing programs, as if they were
benevolent dictators. For example, the person trade-off might ask
respondents to choose between helping X patients with condition
A to improve to A′, versus helping Y patients with condition B
improve to B′. The paradigm for a person trade-off involves
asking representative members of the community to compare the
desirability of giving numbers of patients’ different health
improvements. In one variation of this approach, one of X or Y
is ﬁxed and the other is adjusted until the respondent is indiffer-
ent between the two choices. At this point, the ratio of X to Y
reﬂects the relative value of the improvement from B to B′ com-
pared to the improvement from A to A′. Note that the respondent
to the person trade-off is making judgments about the value of
health outcomes for others. Another feature is that the person
trade-off allows the respondent to incorporate some aspects of
equity or fairness, in that the value of a health improvement can
depend on the baseline level of health (A or B in the example);
speciﬁcally, it is possible to attach a greater value to health
improvement for people who start off in a worse health state than
others.
How Are the Health Outcomes Deﬁned?
In the conventional QALY approach, health outcomes are
deﬁned in terms of health states, and each state is valued at a
particular point in time. Health state utilities are then summed
over time to yield the number of QALYs, with discounting
applied if the QALYs are being used in a cost-effectiveness analy-
sis. By making the assumption that the value of being in a health
state depends neither on the length of time spent in the health
state, nor on the sequence of health states preceding or following
it, the time dimension is taken out of the utility assessment
process. A critical assumption in this regard is that QALY values,
once obtained, are additive over time, possibly weighted by time
preference if discounting is applied.
A more general approach, which relaxes the assumption that
the value of a health state does not depend on the states that
precede or follow it, nor on the length of time spent in it, (i.e.,
intertemporal utility independence), would be to assign value to
sequences of health states over time, sometimes called health
proﬁles [10]. Valuation of health proﬁles is more general than
valuing health states and then summing up, and is therefore
theoretically superior because it does not involve the assumption
of additivity of values over time. The practical problem with
valuing health proﬁles is that, because outcomes are speciﬁed as
complete lifetime paths of health states, there are potentially a
very large number of them. In the context of a Markov model, a
patient-level simulation, or even a clinical trial with multiple
follow-up times, the task of valuing all possible paths or proﬁles
is virtually intractable [9]. If there are N possible health states
and T time periods, the health proﬁle approach requires NT
valuations.
A third approach, covered in more detail by Nord et al. in this
Special Issue [5], values neither absolute health states nor health
proﬁles but focuses on changes in health states. Instead of valuing
health state X and a preferred health state Y separately, value is
attached directly to the improvement from X to Y. The person
trade-off, in particular, invites the respondent to focus on both
the origin and destination health states and, if desired, to attach
greater value to health improvements from less desirable origin
states. One essential difference between this approach and tradi-
tional QALYs is that when coupled with the person trade-off, this
method for eliciting preferences for changes in health focuses on
the health of a community, of which the respondent may (or may
not) perceive himself to be a member.
A similar limitation also applies to this approach as for the
health proﬁle approach: the number of utility elicitations
required can be very large. If there are N possible health states,
the approach that values changes requires N ¥ (N - 1)
valuations—not as large as the number of possible health proﬁles
but still larger than the number of possible health states. For
example, if a range of health states as rich as is provided by
the EQ-5D (243 health states) is desired, there would be
243 ¥ 242 = 58,806 possible changes in health states to consider.
Another problem with this approach is that the pathway for
change from one health state to another can affect the valuation
of that change: the value of improving from X to Y and then
from Y to Z could be different from the value of a direct improve-
ment from X to Z. In fact, if the valuations of changes are always
independent of the pathway, then the approach is equivalent to
valuing the health states themselves.
QALYs from First Principles
To conclude this article, and to serve as a springboard for the
other articles in this Special Issue, we identify nine assumptions
that underlie the conventional QALY approach as used in soci-
etal resource allocation decisions (Table 2).
First, a resource allocation decision has to be made.
Second, the health-related consequences of the alternatives
can be speciﬁed in terms of health states, changes in health states,
and durations of health states over time. All nonhealth conse-
quences are either measured as economic costs and included in
the numerator of the cost-effectiveness ratio, or are omitted
from quantitative consideration as part of the cost-effectiveness
analysis.
Third, resources are limited, and each alternative has an
impact on the resources available, i.e., an opportunity cost.
Fourth, a major objective of the decision-maker is to maxi-
mize the health of the population subject to resource constraints.
Fifth, health is deﬁned as value-weighted time, over the rel-
evant time horizon.
Sixth, value is measured in terms of preference or desirability.
These six premises do not restrict the method used to specify
or value the health outcomes used in QALYs. Next, we turn to
some more restrictive (and controversial) assumptions that relate
speciﬁcally to the conventional QALY concept.
Table 2 Underlying assumptions of the conventional QALY approach
1. A resource-allocation decision must be made.
2. The outcomes of the alternatives can be speciﬁed in terms of health
states, changes, and durations.
3. Resources are limited, and each alternative has resource implications
(costs).
4. A major objective of the decision-maker is to maximize health of the
population, subject to resource constraints.
5. Health is deﬁned as value-weighted time (QALYs) over the relevant time
horizon.
6. Value is measured in terms of preference (desirability).
7. Each individual is risk neutral with respect to longevity and has utility that
is additive across time.
8. Value scores (preferences) measured across individuals can be aggregated
and used for the group
9. QALYs can be aggregated across individuals; i.e., a QALY is a QALY
regardless of who gains/loses it
QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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Seventh, each individual is risk neutral with respect to lon-
gevity and has utility that is additive over time. Risk neutrality is
needed to justify the calculation of quality-adjusted life expect-
ancy, that is, the average value of the possible numbers of
QALYs, each weighted by its probability of occurring. Additivity
over time, discussed previously, is the assumption that allows us
to focus on valuing health states at points in time, without regard
to their duration or sequence. These are very strong assumptions
about preference that undoubtedly simplify reality, but they are
necessary in order for QALYs to represent an individual’s utility
function for health over time. To say that the empirical evidence
is mixed as to whether those assumptions provide a serviceable
approximation to reality is probably generous for QALYs. For
the most part, the evidence is that most people are probably risk
averse with respect to their own longevity (although as societal
agents, they may be less so), and there is substantial evidence that
additivity over time may or may not hold. For example, there is
evidence that people can live with a health problem for a short
time, but that its perceived impact on health is more severe
the longer they have it. This phenomenon has been called
“maximum endurable time” [11]. On the other hand, there is
also evidence that people can adapt to adverse health conditions.
Either of these behaviors would violate the assumption of addi-
tivity of utility or disutility over time, albeit in opposite ways.
Eighth, the value scores or preferences measured across indi-
viduals can be aggregated and used for the group. Finally, the
QALYs calculated using the aggregated preference weights can
themselves be aggregated across individuals.
Other Issues Surrounding QALYs:
Discounting and EquityWeighting
QALYs as the valued outcome for purposes of societal resource
allocation decision-making in health, as in other areas of policy,
should reﬂect positive time preference or discounting. Discount-
ing of both costs and QALYs, and at the same rate, is now the
conventional assumption and is recommended by both the US
Panel and by NICE. Despite the convergence of views in these
two countries, there remain some controversies around discount-
ing. In some countries, such as The Netherlands, the prevailing
view is that costs should be discounted at a higher rate than
QALYs. There is also the position that QALY should not be
discounted at all if risk neutrality holds. The argument for dis-
counting QALYs is driven largely by the opportunity cost argu-
ment, as espoused by the US Panel [4], and yet, a key assumption
is that people as individuals are risk neutral and that QALYs are
valued equally over time. This continues to be a dilemma that
remains to be fully resolved.
Issues of equity and fairness are not incorporated quantita-
tively into the conventional QALY approach, beyond the basic
assumption that each QALY across individuals gets equal weight.
This does not mean that these issues are not important, but it
does mean that they should be weighed by the decision-maker
as additional considerations alongside aggregate QALY gains.
Aggregate health gains, measured by conventional QALYs, are
one of many inputs to the processes of individual clinical decision-
making, societal or programmatic audit, or resource allocation.
The other considerations, including equity and fairness, need to
be considered separately in the conventional QALY approach.
Examples of these aspects include age of the target population, the
baseline health status of the target population, and, perhaps, the
principle that there is more value in raising the minimum health in
the population than in increasing average health by further
improving the health of more healthy people. Political consider-
ations may also compete with aggregate health improvement for a
decision-maker’s priority at the population level. There may be a
felt need to give more priority to orphan diseases, to curing
identiﬁable patients compared to preventing statistical disease, or
to caring for the very youngest and oldest segments of the popu-
lation because they are regarded as most vulnerable.
QALYs have made an important contribution to decision-
making within the health ﬁeld. Within the qualiﬁcations noted
above, the conventional QALY remains a powerful conceptual
tool that we believe can lead to improved decision-making.
QALYs help to make choices, but there are many other dimen-
sions to decision-making within the health-care arena, dimen-
sions not covered by the conventional QALY. Nevertheless, the
conventional QALYs are not intended to incorporate all concerns
of decision-makers [4]. Given the assumptions and the difﬁculties
posed in measurement, it is important to maintain caution in the
use of the QALY. It is nonetheless our view that the conventional
QALY retains an important role in health-care decision-making.
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